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1. INTRODUCTION
There is a com  mon be  lief among econ  o  mists
that sev  eral cen  tral banks have con  ducted their
mon  e  tary pol  icy in a grad  ual man  ner. This be  lief is 
usu  ally sup  ported by the ev  i  dence that of  fi  cial in  -
ter  est rate in ma  jor cen  tral banks, in gen  eral, have
been ad  justed in small move  ments with in  fre  quent 
re  ver  sals, thus giv  ing rise to a path char  ac  ter  ised
by a high de  gree of per  sis  tence (Charts 1, 2, 3 and
4).(1)
In some lit  er  a  ture, this com  mon pat  tern ob  -
served in the be  hav  iour of ma  jor in  ter  est rates is
pointed out as a sign of the pref  er  ence of cen  tral
banks for a gradu  al  ist mon  e  tary pol  icy, also
known  as  “in ter est-rate  smooth ing”.  Ac cord ing  to
this per  spec  tive, cen  tral banks re  vealed some re  -
luc  tance in ad  just  ing in  ter  est rates more ag  gres  -
sively, rather do  ing it grad  u  ally to  wards a new op  -
ti  mal level. From an em  pir  i  cal point of view, this
be hav iour  is  tra di tion ally  in cor po rated  in  the
mod els,  ei ther  by  di rectly  in tro duc ing  a  sta bi liser
of the in  ter  est-rate vari  ance in the cen  tral bank’s
ob jec tive  func tion  or,  al ter na tively,  through  a  par -
tial ad  just  ment mech  a  nism in which the in  ter  est
rate is grad  u  ally ad  justed to  wards an op  ti  mal in  -
ter  est rate de  fined by a mon  e  tary pol  icy rule.
These ap  proaches, how  ever, seem to be chiefly
mo  ti  vated by the need to jus  tify the ac  tual per  sis  -
tence of in  ter  est rates, rather than by any the  o  ret  i  -
cal  con sid er ations  jus ti fy ing  their  use.  There fore,
they do not per  mit a dis  tinc  tion be  tween the ac  -
tual per  sis  tence of in  ter  est rates, as a re  sult of an
ex  plicit pref  er  ence of the au  thor  i  ties for a gradu  al  -
ist  mon e tary  pol icy,  and  the  “nat u ral  per sis tence”
due to the ac  tual per  sis  tence of the eco  nomic vari  -
ables to which the mon  e  tary au  thor  ity re  sponds.
Thus, as ex  plained in the present article, monetary 
policy can only be characterised as more or less
gradualist, when compared with an optimal policy 
rule.
The re  sults ob  tained in some lit  er  a  ture [see
Goodhart (1999) and Sack (1998a)] have shown
that  ac tual  mon e tary  pol icy  has  been  char ac ter ised 
by a de  gree of grad  u  al  ism that can  not be strictly
ex  plained by the dy  namic struc  ture of the econ  -
omy. In other words, the op  ti  mal path for the in  -
Ban  co de Por  tu  gal / Economic bul  le  tin / March 2003 61
Articles
* The views ex  pressed in this ar  ti  cle are those of the au  thor and
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** Eco nomic  Re search  De part ment.
(1) The be  hav  iour of the US Fed  eral Re  serve in 2001 stands some  -
what in con  trast with this ap  proach, since it re  vealed a his  tor  i  -
cally un  prec  e  dented ac  tiv  ity level. In  deed, in the course of
2001, the Fed  eral Re  serve low  ered the tar  get for the Fed  eral
funds rate by an ac  cu  mu  lated 4.75 per  cent  age points to 1.75
per cent. This de  cline was achieved through eleven move  -
ments. In No  vem  ber 2002, the Fed  eral Re  serve low  ered it by
an ad  di  tional 50 ba  sis points. By way of ex  am  ple, and as  sum  -
ing that the Fed  eral Re  serve will not in  tro  duce any ad  di  tional
cuts in the tar  get for the Fed  eral funds rate, it should be men  -
tioned that the pre  vi  ous large in  ter  est rate down  ward cy  cle in
the United States had been sig  nif  i  cantly lon  ger, spread  ing from 
June 1989 to Sep  tem  ber 1992. Over this pe  riod, the Fed  eral Re  -
serve low  ered the tar  get for the Fed  eral Funds rates by 6.75
per  cent  age points to 3.0 per cent, through 22 movements, 14 of
which of 25 basis points.
(2) The very no  tion of grad  u  al  ism de  pends on the mon  e  tary pol  -
icy  in stru ment  con sid ered.  For  ex am ple,  an  ag gres sive  in ter est
rate rule is con  sis  tent with a more gradu  al  ist rule for mon  e  tary
growth and vice-versa, al  though most works fo  cus the anal  y  sis 
on interest rate rules.ter est  rates  emerg ing  from  dif fer ent  mac ro eco -
nomic mod  els is usu  ally less grad  ual than that ac  -
tu ally  ob served.(2) 
A  pos si ble  ex pla na tion  for  the  di ver gence  be -
tween the in  di  ca  tions given by the mod  els and the
ac  tual be  hav  iour is that the for  mer may not ad  e  -
quately deal with the un  cer  tainty sur  round  ing
mon e tary  pol icy  de ci sions.(3) In fact, mon  e  tary au  -
thor  i  ties face a large num  ber of un  cer  tain  ties, in  -
clud  ing the un  cer  tainty about the state of the econ  -
omy, un  cer  tainty as to the mag  ni  tude of the pa  -
ram e ters  char ac ter is ing  the  trans mis sion  mech a -
nism of mon  e  tary pol  icy and un  cer  tainty about
the model de  scrib  ing the be  hav  iour of the econ  -
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(3) This ar  ti  cle does not dis  cuss to what ex  tent the de  ci  sion-mak  ing 
pro  cess by a col  le  giate body, such as the EBC Gov  ern  ing Coun  -
cil or the Fed  eral Open Mar  ket Com  mit  tee, and the typ  i  cally
adopted  de ci sion  rule  (sim ple  ma jor ity,  qual i fies  ma jor ity,  con -
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Daily figuresomy. In this per  spec  tive, the pres  ent ar  ti  cle anal  y  -
ses the ma  jor re  sults ob  tained in lit  er  a  ture as re  -
gards the ef  fects of the dif  fer  ent types of
uncertainty on the degree of gradualism in the
conduct of monetary policy.
The ar  ti  cle is struc  tured as fol  lows. Sec  tion 2
de  scribes a set of char  ac  ter  is  tics com  mon to the be  -
hav  iour of the ma  jor of  fi  cial in  ter  est rates, based
on a num  ber of sum  mary sta  tis  tics nor  mally used
to sup  port the no  tion that mon  e  tary pol  icy is con  -
ducted in a gradu  al  ist fash  ion. Sec  tion 3 ex  plains
why the in  for  ma  tion con  tent of these sta  tis  tics
should be in  ter  preted with cau  tion and pres  ents a
def i ni tion  of  gradu al ist  mon e tary  pol icy  and  a
pos si ble  ap proach  to  its  iden ti fi ca tion.  Sec tion  4
de  scribes the dif  fer  ent types of un  cer  tainty faced
by  mon e tary  au thor i ties,  with  par tic u lar  em pha sis
on the so-called pa  ram  e  ter un  cer  tainty, and shows
how the “op  ti  mal” level of mon  e  tary pol  icy grad  -
u  al  ism is sensitive to the type of uncertainty
specified. Section 5 presents some conclusions. 
2. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS 
IN THE BEHAVIOUR OF MAJOR OFFICIAL
INTEREST RATES 
Not with stand ing  the  large  dif fer ences  in  the
pat  tern of the in  ter  est rate changes in  tro  duced by
the  dif fer ent  mon e tary  au thor i ties,  there  are  still
im por tant  be hav iour  sim i lar i ties  that  ul ti mately
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Ta ble  1
FEDERAL RESERVE, BUNDESBANK, BANK OF ENGLAND AND ECB: MEASURES OF THE DEGREE 
OF PERSISTENCE OBSERVED IN OFFICIAL INTEREST RATES
Based on data avail  able up to 31 De  cem  ber 2002
Of fi cial  in ter est  rates  Fed  eral Re  serve
 (Fed Funds Tar  get)
Bank of Eng  land 
(Repo)
Bundesbank
 (Dis  count)
   ECB
   (MRO
    in  ter  est













Num  ber of move  ments........................... 17 18 24 15 15 13
Up ward  move ments ............................. 8 6 10 4 1 7
Down ward  move ments .......................... 9 12 14 11 14 6
Size of the move  ments (ba  sis points)
   100 bps ....................................... 0 0 4 0 0 0
   75 bps ........................................ 1 0 0 0 1 0
   50 bps ........................................ 4 10 7 2 11 6
   25 bps ........................................ 12 8 13 13 3 7
Size of the rises
   100 bps ....................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0
   75 bps ........................................ 1 0 0 0 1 0
   50 bps ........................................ 3 1 3 0 0 2
   25 bps ........................................ 4 5 7 4 0 5
Size of the de  clines
   100 bps ....................................... 0 0 4 0 0 0
   75 bps ........................................ 0 0 0 0 0 0
   50 bps ........................................ 1 9 4 2 11 4
   25 bps ........................................ 8 3 6 9 3 2
Trend  re ver sals ................................. 4 2 4 2 1 2
Av er age  of  days  be tween  con sec u tive  move ments... 148 81 111 71 105 113
Max  i  mum num  ber of days with  out move  ments ..... 553 330 314 364 322 392
Min  i  mum num  ber of days with  out move  ments ..... 15 15 24 16 28 18
Av  er  age of days be  tween each re  ver  sal 
   and the pre  vi  ous move  ment..................... 411 229 201 227 198 214con  trib  ute to the ex  is  tence of per  sis  tence of official 
interest rates:
1. In  fre  quent and mi  nor in  ter  est rate changes — in  -
ter  est rate changes are rel  a  tively in  fre  quent,
chiefly tak  ing into ac  count the pace of dis  sem  i  na  -
tion  of  rel e vant  in for ma tion  on  eco nomic  de vel op -
ments. In  for  ma  tion that is likely to lead, at least
mar  gin  ally, to changes in in  fla  tion and/or growth
fore  casts is made avail  able on a daily ba  sis. How  -
ever, most cen  tral banks do not change their in  ter  -
est rates more than once a month, and sev  eral
months may go by with  out any change. In ad  di  -
tion, when there are changes, these, in gen  eral, do
not ex  ceed 25 ba  sis points. Ta  ble 1 shows that, be  -
tween 1992 and 1998, the av  er  age num  ber of days
be  tween con  sec  u  tive move  ments by the said au  -
thor  i  ties stood be  tween 105 and 148 days. Note
that the mag  ni  tude of the move  ments, in most sit  -
u  a  tions, did not ex  ceed 50 ba  sis points (in the case
of the Fed  eral Re  serve and the Bank of Eng  land,
the 25 ba  sis point move  ments were more fre  quent, 
while in the case of the Bundesbank 50 basis point
movements were predominant).
2. Un  usual re  ver  sals in the in  ter  est rate path — re  -
ver  sals in the in  ter  est rate trend are fre  quently pre  -
ceded by a se  quence of move  ments in the same di  -
rec  tion. In prac  tice, this means that there is a
strong per  sis  tence in of  fi  cial in  ter  est rates. In the
case of the Fed  eral Re  serve, for in  stance, be  tween
1992 and 2002, only six of the 35 changes an  -
nounced in the tar  get for the Fed  eral funds rate
cor  re  sponded to a trend reversal.
3. Main  te  nance of the in  ter  est rates for a rel  a  tively
long pe  riod be  fore any re  ver  sal in the re  spec  tive trend
— ev  i  dence shows that the time gap be  tween
move  ments in the same di  rec  tion is rather shorter
than the time gap be  tween move  ments in op  po  site 
di  rec  tions. Fur  ther  more, as the pe  riod of time
from the last in  ter  est change in  creases, there is a
higher  prob a bil ity  that  the  forth com ing  in ter est
rate change may re  flect a trend re  ver  sal.(4) Ta  ble 1
shows that over the last ten years, for the mon  e  -
tary au  thor  i  ties in ques  tion, the av  er  age length of
the  pe ri ods  pre ced ing  in ter est-rate  trend  re ver sals
was two to three times longer than the average
length of overall movements.
 3. PERSISTENCE OF THE INTEREST RATES
AND MONETARY POLICY GRADUALISM 
In some lit  er  a  ture, the com  mon pat  tern of be  -
hav  iour of ma  jor above-men  tioned in  ter  est rates is 
con  sid  ered to be ev  i  dence of the adop  tion of a
gradu al ist  pol icy  (“in ter est-rate  smooth ing”)  that
is  ul ti mately  re spon si ble  for  the  for ma tion  of  the
so-called  “in ter est-rate  cy cles”.(5) Some econ  o  -
mists, such as Goodhart (1997), claim that in  ter  -
est-rate cy  cles con  trib  ute (and do not coun  ter, as
would be de  sir  able) to the for  ma  tion of eco  nomic
cy  cles. Ac  cord  ing to this per  spec  tive, if the in  ter  est 
rates would evince a less cy  cli  cal be  hav  iour, and if 
cen  tral banks were will  ing to change their in  ter  est
rates more fre  quently and more widely, the length
of the eco  nomic cy  cles could be re  duced. Ex  pres  -
sions like “too lit  tle and too late” or “to be be  hind
the curve” are of  ten used to criti  cise the per  cep  ti  -
ble re  luc  tance of some monetary authorities to
change interest rates more aggressively. 
From an em  pir  i  cal point of view, the pref  er  ence 
of  mon e tary  au thor i ties  for  a  gradu al ist  pol icy  is
usu  ally in  cor  po  rated in the mod  els ei  ther by di  -
rectly in  tro  duc  ing in the cen  tral bank’s ob  jec  tive
func  tion a term that would al  low the re  duc  tion of
the in  ter  est rate vari  ance [see, for in  stance,
Söderlind (2001) or Rudebusch and Svens  son
(1999)] or, al  ter  na  tively, through a par  tial ad  just  -
ment mech  a  nism, in which the cen  tral bank grad  -
u  ally changes the of  fi  cial in  ter  est rate to  wards an
op ti mal  in ter est  rate  de fined  by  a  mon e tary  pol icy
rule [see Clarida et al (1997) or Batini and Haldane
(1999)].(6) How  ever, any of the above ap  proaches
seems to be chiefly due to the need to jus  tify the
ac  tual per  sis  tence of in  ter  est rates, and not to
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(4) A Probit model es  ti  mated for the United States be  tween Jan  u  -
ary 1990 and De  cem  ber 2001  — a pe  riod that wit  nessed 49
move  ments in the Fed  eral funds rates, 9 of which cor  re  sponded 
to trend re  ver  sals, showed the fol  low  ing equa  tion for the prob  -
a  bil  ity of re  ver  sal of the interest rate trend:
( ) ( ) P I D = = - + 1 4 546 0 024 F . .
where I as  sumes the value 1 when the in  ter  est rate move  ment
cor  re  sponds to a re  ver  sal, and 0 in the op  po  site case. F(.)rep re -
sents the dis  tri  bu  tion func  tion of a nor  mal stan  dard dis  tri  bu  -
tion and D rep  re  sents the pe  riod of time elapsed (in days) be  -
tween  con sec u tive  in ter est  rate  changes.  The  t-rácio for D co ef -
fi  cient is 2.31.
(5) See, for in  stance, Lowe and Ellis (1997).considerations underpinning their use [see
Woodford (1999)].
There are sev  eral rea  sons be  hind the pref  er  ence 
of  the  au thor i ties  for  a  gradu al ist  mon e tary  pol -
icy.(7)  None the less,  the  in cor po ra tion  in  the  ob jec -
tive func  tion of an in  ter  est rate sta  bi  liser does not
per mit  a  dis tinc tion  be tween  ac tual  per sis tence  of
in  ter  est rates as a re  sult of an ex  plicit pref  er  ence of 
the  au thor i ties  for  a  gradu al ist  mon e tary  pol icy
and the “nat  u  ral per  sis  tence” due to the in  er  tia ob  -
served in the eco  nomic vari  ables to which the
mon  e  tary au  thor  ity re  sponds. In other words, in
the  for mu la tion  of  mon e tary  pol icy,  mon e tary  au -
thor  i  ties take into ac  count the dy  nam  ics of the
so-called fun  da  men  tal vari  ables of the econ  omy,
such as out  put and in  fla  tion. Given that shocks to
these  vari ables  ex hibit  strong  se rial  cor re la tion
and re  spond to mon  e  tary pol  icy with a sub  stan  tial 
lag, some per  sis  tence in of  fi  cial rates may be ex  -
pected even in the ab  sence of an in  ter  est-rate
smooth  ing ob  jec  tive. In this per  spec  tive, a gradu  -
al  ist mon  e  tary pol  icy should be un  der  stood as the
ten  dency to limit changes in the of  fi  cial in  ter  est
rates to a de  gree greater than the one ac  counted
for the dy  namic struc  ture of the econ  omy. Thus, a
monetary policy can only be characterised as more 
or less gradualist when compared with an optimal 
policy rule.
In  or der  to  dis tin guish  be tween  per sis tence  in -
duced by mon  e  tary pol  icy and per  sis  tence re  sult  -
ing from the dy  namic be  hav  iour of non-pol  icy
vari  ables, it is nec  es  sary, first, to char  ac  ter  ise the
struc  tural form of the econ  omy, which can be
achieved through the es  ti  ma  tion of a VAR model
formulated as follows:
 W A W b i v t i t j
j
q
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where  Wt is a n´1 vec  tor of non-pol  icy vari  -
ables (i.e. vari  ables not di  rectly con  trolled by mon  -
e  tary pol  icy) that may in  clude the in  fla  tion rate,
the GDP growth rate, the un  em  ploy  ment rate or
an in  dex of com  mod  ity prices, it is the in  ter  est rate 
and q is the num  ber of VAR lags. The VAR de  -
scribes both the struc  ture of the non-pol  icy vari  -
ables in the econ  omy, and the re  ac  tion func  tion of
the  mon e tary  au thor ity.  How ever,  in  de riv ing  op ti -
mal mon  e  tary pol  icy, the re  ac  tion func  tion of the
mon e tary  au thor ity  is  com pletely  ig nored.  Thus,
af  ter cal  cu  lat  ing the struc  tural form of the econ  -
omy es  ti  mated from the VAR, it is pos  si  ble to de  -
ter  mine an op  ti  mal in  ter  est rate that mini  mises the 
pres  ent dis  counted value of the sum of the out  put
gap, xt and the de  vi  a  tion of the in  fla  tion rate ( ) pt
from its tar  get ( ) p * . A pos  si  ble objective function
to be minimised could be formulated as follows:
 



















where  b rep  re  sents the dis  count fac  tor ( ) 0 1 < < b
and l the rel  a  tive weight as  signed to the sta  bili  sa  -
tion of the out  put gap. This for  mu  la  tion is rel  a  -
tively  con ven tional  in  lit er a ture  [see  Wood ford
(1999)].(8) It should be noted, how  ever, that it does
not show any term mini  mis  ing the in  ter  est rate
vari  ance, given that the pur  pose is to in  ves  ti  gate
whether the ac  tual per  sis  tence of in  ter  est rates can
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(6) This lat  ter ap  proach may be rep  re  sented in for  mal terms by the 
fol low ing  equa tion:
( ) i i i t t = - + - 1 1 r r t
* ,
where it de  fines an in  ter  est rate di  rectly or in  di  rectly con  trolled 
by  the  mon e tary  au thor ity  and  it
* is an op  ti  mal in  ter  est rate de  -
fined, for in  stance, on the ba  sis of a Tay  lor rule. Usu  ally, the
em pir i cal  re sults  pres ent  high  val ues  for  the  pa ram e ter  r that
mea  sures the de  gree of per  sis  tence of the in  ter  est rate [see Sack
(1998b)]. 
(7) A num  ber of jus  ti  fi  ca  tions have been pointed out in lit  er  a  ture
for  the  pref er ence  of  mon e tary  au thor i ties  for  a  gradu al ist  mon -
e tary  pol icy.  A  tra di tional  ex pla na tion  con sists  in  the  will ing -
ness of cen  tral banks to re  duce vol  a  til  ity in the fi  nan  cial mar  -
kets, a sit  u  a  tion that would be fa  cil  i  tated if in  ter  est rate changes 
would be grad  ual and fore  see  able. Some au  thors sus  tain that if
cen  tral banks would fre  quently re  verse their in  ter  est rate trend, 
this might be in  ter  preted as a sig  nal of im  per  fect knowl  edge or
even of in  com  pe  tence, which would threaten their cred  i  bil  ity.
Goodhart (1997) sus  tains that the ma  jor cause be  hind the pref  -
er  ence for a gradu  al  ist mon  e  tary pol  icy lies in the nat  u  ral con  -
ser  va  tism of mon  e  tary au  thor  i  ties, which tend to change of  fi  -
cial in  ter  est rates only when there is solid ev  i  dence sup  port  ing
the de  ci  sion. Since that ev  i  dence emerges only slowly, in  ter  est
rates are ad  justed also slowly. More re  cently an ex  pla  na  tion
has been ad  vanced, in  volv  ing the in  ter  ac  tion be  tween a sys  -
tem  atic mon  e  tary pol  icy and the ex  is  tence of agents with for  -
ward  look ing  ex pec ta tions  (as  op posed  to  ex pec ta tions  based
only on the ex  trap  o  la  tion of past be  hav  iour). Ac  cord  ing to this
per spec tive,  a  gradu al ist  and  sys tem atic  mon e tary  pol icy
makes pos  si  ble that small changes in short-term in  ter  est rates
have a stron  ger im  pact on lon  ger-term in  ter  est rates and,
therefore, on the economy [these arguments can be found, for
instance, in Goodfriend (1991), Sack and Wieland (1999) and
Amato and Laubach (1999)].be ex  plained with  out sim  ply as  sum  ing that the
au thor i ties  pre fer  to  con duct  mon e tary  pol icy  in  a
grad ual  man ner.  The  pa ram e ters  of  the  in ter est
rate re  sult  ing from a prob  lem of dy  namic pro  -
gram ming  are  p b l *, and , which are ex  og  e  nously
de fined  and  are  a  func tion  of  con tem po ra ne ous
and lagged val  ues of the model vari  ables that, in
ad  di  tion to the in  fla  tion rate, the interest rate and
the output gap, could also include other variables: 
i g x x x i i i t t t t k t t t k t t t
* , , , , , , , , , . , = - - - - - - - 1 1 1 2 K K K p p p ( ) k| , ,
* p l b
where  k is the re  sult of the lag struc  ture de  ter  -
mined by the VAR model. Note that the op  ti  mal
in ter est  rate  it
* de  pends on the lagged val  ues of the 
in  ter  est rate de  ter  mined by the VAR model it  self.
There  fore, even in the ab  sence of any ex  plicit
smooth en ing  ob jec tive  by  mon e tary  au thor i ties,
the  op ti mal  in ter est  rate  re veals  a  nat u ral  per sis -
tence. Ac  cord  ingly, since at least one part of the
ac  tual per  sis  tence of in  ter  est rates may re  sult from 
the dy  namic struc  ture of the econ  omy, the mere
anal  y  sis of the sta  tis  tics pre  sented in Ta  ble 1 does
not al  low for any con  clu  sion to be drawn in terms
of the de  gree of grad  u  al  ism of mon  e  tary pol  icy.
These sta  tis  tics would be in  for  ma  tive if, in the ab  -
sence of the sta  bi  lis  ing term in the ob  jec  tive func  -
tion, the se  ries of changes in official interest rates
had a  random-walk type behaviour. 
Thus, the eval  u  a  tion of the de  gree of grad  u  al  -
ism  of  mon e tary  pol icy  re quires  a  com par i son  be -
tween changes in the ac  tual in  ter  est rate (Dit) and
changes in the op  ti  mal in  ter  est rate (Dit
*). As sug  -
gested by Sack (1998a) a pos  si  ble mea  sure could
be  the  com par i son  of  vol a til ity  be tween  these  two











The re  sults ob  tained in some stud  ies [Goodhart 
(1999) and Sack (1998a)] have shown that ac  tual
mon e tary  pol icy  in  dif fer ent  coun tries  has  been
char ac ter ised  by  a  de gree  of  grad u al ism  that  can -
not be strictly ex  plained by the dy  nam  ics of the
eco nomic  vari ables  to  which  mon e tary  au thor i ties
re  spond. In other words, the op  ti  mal path for in  -
ter est  rates  emerg ing  from  dif fer ent  mac ro eco -
nomic mod  els is usu  ally less per  sis  tent than the
ac  tual path [see, for in  stance, Goodhart (1999)].
The cru  cial is  sue is to as  cer  tain whether this sit  u  a  -
tion  im plies  that  mon e tary  au thor i ties  have
adopted  sub-op ti mal  mon e tary  pol icy  strat e gies  or 
whether, on the con  trary, there are fac  tors not in  -
cluded in the models that justify the strategies
followed so far.
4. UNCERTAINTY AND DEGREE OF ACTIVISM 
OF MONETARY POLICY 
A  pos si ble  ex pla na tion  for  the  di ver gence  be -
tween the in  di  ca  tions given by the mod  els and ac  -
tual prac  tice is that the for  mer may not deal ad  e  -
quately with the un  cer  tainty sur  round  ing mon  e  -
tary  pol icy  de ci sions.  The  tra di tional  ap proach  for
the  anal y sis  of  mon e tary  pol icy  un der  un cer tainty
con sists  in  the  spec i fi ca tion  of  an  ob jec tive  func -
tion for mon  e  tary au  thor  i  ties and of a mac  ro  eco  -
nomic model, so as to de  ter  mine how mon  e  tary
pol  icy may re  spond to shocks in the econ  omy. The 
man ner  in  which  un cer tainty  af fects  mon e tary  pol -
icy  ul ti mately  de pends  on  the  spec i fi ca tion  of  the
model and on the type of uncertainty considered.
4.1. Optimal monetary policy under additive
uncertainty 
Many ac  a  demic stud  ies as  sume that the au  thor  -
i  ties take their mon  e  tary pol  icy de  ci  sions as if they 
were un  der cer  tainty. This re  sults in ad  mit  ting that 
un  cer  tainty faced by pol  icy-mak  ers as  sumes a par  -
tic u lar  form.  Spe cif i cally,  un cer tainty  is  in tro duced 
in the anal  y  sis through ad  di  tive (mean zero)
shocks  on the ob  jec  tive vari  ables of mon  e  tary au  -
thor i ties.  This,  given  the  qua dratic-lin ear  spec i fi ca -
tion of these mod  els (thus known be  cause the ob  -
jec  tive func  tion is qua  dratic and the re  stric  tion is
lin ear),  does  not  af fect  the  op ti mi sa tion  prob lem.
This  sit u a tion  cor re sponds  to  what  in  lit er a ture  is
known as “cer  tainty equiv  a  lence”, i.e. the op  ti  mal
rule ob  tained un  der un  cer  tainty is the same as if
the sit  u  a  tion of the econ  omy were per  fectly ob  -
served  (com plete  in for ma tion).(9)
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(8) When com  pared with other ob  jec  tive func  tions used in this type 
of lit  er  a  ture [for in  stance, Wood  ford (1999)], a sa  lient dif  fer  ence 
is the ab  sence of fu  ture val  ues for in  fla  tion and for the out  put
gap. As dem  on  strated by Wood  ford (op cit), these fu  ture val  ues 
alone may cre  ate an in  cen  tive for some in  ter  est-rate
smoothening.In this frame  work, the spec  i  fied mod  els rec  og  -
nize that un  cer  tainty is in  de  pend  ent from the be  -
hav iour  of  mon e tary  au thor i ties.  There fore,  the
sole un  cer  tainty con  sid  ered is that aris  ing when
the econ  omy vari  ables are lagged from the fore  -
cast path — the so-called ad  di  tive un  cer  tainty.
Against this back  ground, au  thor  i  ties should ig  -
nore the ef  fects of uncertainty on the economy.
This sit  u  a  tion may be il  lus  trated by means of a
sim  ple the  o  ret  i  cal model for a closed econ  omy,
sim  i  lar to that pre  sented by Svens  son (1996). It al  -
lows for the con  se  quences of the pa  ram  e  ter un  cer  -
tainty to be dis  cussed in or  der to de  ter  mine op  ti  -
mal mon  e  tary pol  icy, in a con  text in which an au  -
thor  ity ad  justs the in  ter  est rate so as to ob  tain a
tar  get for the in  fla  tion rate.(10)  The model, how  -
ever, due to its sim  plic  ity, nec  es  sar  ily has some
weak nesses.  In  par tic u lar,  it  has  not  mi cro ec o -
nomic foun  da  tion and, since it pres  ents the equa  -
tions in their re  duced form, it does not per  mit the
iden  ti  fi  ca  tion of the source of shocks hit  ting the
econ omy.  Lit er a ture  pres ents  al ter na tive  mod els,
with  mi cro ec o nomic  foun da tions,  but  they  are  less 
  tractable to il  lus  trate the prob  lem un  der dis  cus  -
sion [see, for in  stance, Khan et al (2000)].
The ba  sis of the model is a two-equa  tion sys  -
tem. The first one (a ver  sion of the Phillips curve)
es tab lishes  a  re la tion ship  be tween  the  in fla tion
rate  pt and the out  put gap xt:
p p g t t t a x + + = + 1 1  (1) 
The sec  ond equa  tion (a ver  sion of the IS curve)
es tab lishes  an  in verse  re la tion ship  be tween  the
out  put gap and real in  ter  est rate pre  vail  ing in the
pre vi ous  pe riod  ( ) rt  de  fined in terms of a de  vi  a  -
tion from the neu  tral or equi  lib  rium level, sub  ject
to  ad di tive  shocks,  xt+1,  in de pend ently  dis trib uted
with mean zero and vari  ance s x
2:
x r t t t + + =- + 1 1 d x (2)
The in  ter  est rate set at the end of the t  to be in
force un  til t+1  is given by the Fisher  equa  tion:
r i E t t t t = - + p 1 (3)
where  it is the nom  i  nal in  ter  est rate de  fined in
terms of the de  vi  a  tion vis-à-vis the neu  tral or equi  -
lib  rium value. By re  plac  ing (2) in (1) we ob  tain the 
re  duced form for the in  fla  tion rate:
p p e t t t t a br + + = - + 1 1 (4)
with b= = gd e gxt+1 a t +1 nd .    Mon e tary  au thor i ties 
set the in  ter  est rate with a view to reach  ing an in  -
fla tion  tar get  p
*. Spe  cif  i  cally, it is as  sumed that the 
pur pose  of  mon e tary  au thor i ties  is  to  mini mise  the 
squared de  vi  a  tion of in  fla  tion from the tar  get, the
lat  ter be  ing nor  mal  ised to zero. This is equiv  a  lent
to mini  mise both the squared de  vi  a  tion of the ex  -
pected value of the in  fla  tion rate from tar  get (the
squared bias) and un  cer  tainty as to fu  ture in  fla  tion 
(in fla tion  vari ance).  For mally,  the  mini mi sa tion  of
the ob  jec  tive func  tion can be writ  ten as fol  lows:(11)
  
Et t p +1
2 (5)
or,  al ter na tively,
( ) ( ) biast t t t p p + + + 1
2
1 var (5a)(12) 
The only source of un  cer  tainty in model (4) re  -
sults from the shock in  tro  duced in the IS equa  tion. 
Thus, it is as  sumed that the au  thor  i  ties are def  i  -
nitely fully ac  quainted with: i) the model pa  ram  e  -
ters; ii) the state of the econ  omy, which im  plies
that, for in  stance, the in  fla  tion rate and the out  put
gap do not re  veal mea  sure  ment er  rors and that au  -
thor  i  ties are able to per  fectly iden  tify the type of
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(9) Is this case, the so-called “sep  a  ra  tion prin  ci  ple” is ap  pli  ca  ble,
ac  cord  ing to which the prob  lem of se  lec  tion of the op  ti  mal pol  -
icy  (op ti mi sa tion  prob lem)  and  the  prob lem  of  es ti ma tion  of
the cur  rent state of the econ  omy (prob  lem of ex  trac  tion the sig  -
nal) may be dealt with sep  a  rately [see, for in  stance, Svensson
and Woodford (2002)].
(10)See Mar  tin (1999) for an ap  pli  ca  tion of the same type of model
within the frame  work of an open econ  omy.
(11)This prob  lem may be solved through dy  namic pro  gram  ming.
How  ever, Svens  son (1996 and 1997) shows that the so  lu  tion
usu  ally co  in  cides with that ob  tained with the op  ti  mi  sa  tion for a 
sin  gle pe  riod, the ob  jec  tive func  tion be  ing given by equation
(5).
(12)The bias of the ran  dom vari  able p t+1 is de  fined as
Et t p p + - 1
* and mea  sures the dif  fer  ence be  tween ex  pected in  -
fla  tion and the in  fla  tion tar  get. Equa  tion (5a) re  sults from the
fact that:





2 * * ,
where the sec  ond term stands for the vari  ance.shocks hit  ting the econ  omy; and, per  chance more
im  por  tant, iii) the func  tional form of the econ  omy
(i.e. the man  ner in which in  fla  tion and the out  put
gap are in  ter  re  lated). Tak  ing into ac  count these hy  -
poth e sis,  by  re plac ing  (4)  in  (5),  dif fer en ti at ing  in
or der  to  rt and set  ting the result equal to zero, the




t t = p (6)
By re  plac  ing (6) in (4), we ob  tain the equi  lib  -
rium path for the in  fla  tion rate:
 
p e t t + + = 1 1 (7)
Based on (6) and (7), the op  ti  mal mon  e  tary pol  -





t t = e (8)
In or  der to reach this op  ti  mal path for the real
in  ter  est rate, based on (3) and tak  ing into ac  count
that  in fla tion  ex pec ta tions  are  zero,  the  in ter est




t t t t t = + = + p e 1   (9)
This rule ful  fils “cer  tainty equiv  a  lence prin  ci  -
ple”: the same op  ti  mal rule would be ob  tained if
there were no un  cer  tainty. Once the shock over in  -
fla  tion is ob  served, the op  ti  mal re  sponse of the au  -
thor  i  ties will be to fully can  cel its ef  fects, so that
the in  fla  tion rate may re  sume the tar  get. This
means that, al  though the au  thor  i  ties are not able
to  avoid  tem po rary  de vi a tions  of  in fla tion  from
tar  get, they may en  sure that these de  vi  a  tions are
not  per ma nent.  There fore,  op ti mal  mon e tary  pol -
icy would be char  ac  ter  ised by a high de  gree of ag  -
gres  sive  ness. It is ob  vi  ous that this re  sult de  pends
on the above hy  poth  e  ses (i) to (iii). These make it
pos si ble  for  the  au thor i ties  to  iden tify  un am big u -
ously the type of shock faced and the man  ner in
which the mon  e  tary pol  icy in  stru  ment should be
ad justed.  In  prac tice,  how ever,  mon e tary  au thor i -
ties are not able to iden  tify clearly either the type
of shocks faced by the economy or the best
response to those shocks.
4.2. Optimal monetary policy under parameter
uncertainty
Some more re  cent stud  ies have at  tempted to
ex plore  the  im pli ca tions  for  mon e tary  pol icy  of  a
wider range of un  cer  tain  ties [see, for ex  am  ple,
Sack (1998a)]. One strand of re  search has tried to
gauge the ex  tent to which un  cer  tainty about the
pa ram e ter  mag ni tude  of  the  trans mis sion  mech a -
nism may lead to a less ag  gres  sive re  sponse of
mon  e  tary pol  icy to eco  nomic shocks. This anal  y  sis 
hav  ing its roots in the work of Brainard (1967) is
based on the as  sump  tion that un  cer  tainty about
the  re la tion ship  be tween  of fi cial  in ter est  rates  and
the rest of the econ  omy (a form of pa  ram  e  ter un  -
cer  tainty) cre  ates a trade-off for mon  e  tary au  thor  i  -
ties:  the  pres ence  of  pa ram e ter  un cer tainty  may
im ply  that  move ments  in  of fi cial  in ter est  rates
could lead to an in  crease in un  cer  tainty about the
fu  ture path of the econ  omy. In this case, mon  e  tary
au  thor  i  ties should be more cau  tious, even if this
would mean a worse out  come on av  er  age, in or  der 
to re  duce the prob  a  bil  ity of fall  ing a long way
short of the tar  get set (Brainard’s prin  ci  ple): “(...)
cen  tral banks must avoid be  com  ing a source of ad  -
di  tional un  cer  tainty them  selves when there is only 
limited knowledge about the economy and the
behaviour of economic agents” [Issing (2002)].
The  con sid er ation  of  the  so-called  pa ram e ter
un  cer  tainty leads to the elim  i  na  tion of the above
hy  poth  e  sis (i). This type of un  cer  tainty arises
when it is as  sumed that au  thor  i  ties know the
struc tural  equa tions  char ac ter is ing  the  econ omy,
but ig  nore the size of the mul  ti  pli  ers, thus hav  ing
to es  ti  mate them. For ex  am  ple, if in equa  tion (4),
au thor i ties  ig nore  the  value  of  pa ram e ter  b, they
can  not as  sess the im  pact of in  ter  est rate changes
on the output gap and thus on inflation.
Brainard (1967) as  sumed that au  thor  i  ties ig  nore 
the ac  tual fig  ures of model pa  ram  e  ters, but know
their dis  tri  bu  tion. Us  ing the model above, it is as  -
sumed  that  pa ram e ters    a and b fol  low a nor  mal
dis tri bu tion,(13) with means a and b, and vari  ances 
s s a b
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(13)The  hy poth e sis  of  pa ram e ter  nor mal ity  is  not  strictly  nec es sary.We as  sume, in a first anal  y  sis, that the
covariance be  tween these two pa  ram  e  ters is zero.
In this case, us  ing (4), the ob  jec  tive func  tion (5a)
may be writ  ten  as











2 2 2 2 2 2 2 p p s p s s e (5b)
Dif fer en ti at ing  in  or der  to  rt and equal  ling to



















For a better com  par  i  son with the sit  u  a  tion pre  -
sented in the pre  vi  ous sec  tion, let us rep  re  sent by




 and de  fine






2 . Thus, equa  tion




t t = p (10a)
Pa ram e ter  h de  fines the gap iden  ti  fied by
Brainard,  and shows that the re  sponse to shock et, 
un der  pa ram e ter  un cer tainty,  is  a  frac tion  of  the
re  sponse in the sit  u  a  tion in which cer  tainty equi-
va lence  oc curs  (since  h stands be  tween zero and
one). This frac  tion is ex  clu  sively de  ter  mined by
the co  ef  fi  cient of vari  a  tion, i.e. by the rel  a  tive size
of un  cer  tainty (mea  sured by the stan  dard de  vi  a  -
tion) in re  la  tion to the mean of the pol  icy mul  ti  -
plier. When un  cer  tainty is high, h is small and
mon e tary  pol icy  be comes  more  gradu al ist.  As  the
rel a tive  weight  of  un cer tainty  de clines,  h tends to
one and the op  ti  mal re  sponse of mon  e  tary pol  icy
gets closer to the sit  u  a  tion de  scribed in the pre  vi  -
ous  sub sec tion.  In  this  con text,  mon e tary  au thor i -
ties face a trade-off be  tween the de  sire to bring the 
in  fla  tion rate back to the tar  get (re  duc  tion of the
in  fla  tion bias) and the de  sire to mini  mise the risk
of in  creased vol  a  til  ity in in  fla  tion with only one in  -
stru ment  avail able  ( ) it . De  riv  ing from (5b), the
vari  ance of in  fla  tion de  pends pos  i  tively on the real 
in  ter  est rate de  vi  a  tion from its neu  tral level, and
thus  mon e tary  pol icy  de ci sions  af fect  the  un cer -
tainty about fu  ture in  fla  tion. Thus, by con  trast
with the ad  di  tive un  cer  tainty model, vari  ance be  -
comes en  dog  e  nous. There  fore, within this model
mon e tary  au thor i ties  ad just  in ter est  rates  to  a
smaller ex  tent than they would do in a sce  nario
with  out un  cer  tainty, ( i.e. it is not op  ti  mal to com  -
pletely off  set a shock in any pe  riod). This sit  u  a  tion 
is what Blinder (1998) calls “Brainard’s con  ser  va  -
tism prin  ci  ple”: “Es  ti  mate how much you need to
tighten or loosen mon  e  tary pol  icy to get it right.
Then do less”. The response of monetary policy is
thus spread over several periods.(14)
Re  plac  ing the mon  e  tary pol  icy rule (10a) in (4)
and  ap ply ing  the  ex pec ta tion  op er a tor,  we  obtain:
 
( ) E a h t t t p p + = - 1 1 (11)
The  op ti mal  nom i nal  in ter est  rate  re sults  from
the sum of the op  ti  mal rule for the real in  ter  est




a h t t t = + - p p 1 (12)
Equa  tion (12) shows that the im  pli  ca  tions in
terms  of  ma nip u la tion  of  mon e tary  pol icy  in stru -
ment re  sult  ing from a gradu  al  ist rule for the real
in ter est  rate  may  be  am big u ous.  Ana lys ing  the
right-hand side of equa  tion (12), we ver  ify that:
the first term (real in  ter  est rate) points to a more
gradu  al  ist pol  icy, while the sec  ond term (in  fla  tion
ex  pec  ta  tions) trans  lates the fact that a gradu  al  ist
rule for the real in  ter  est rate leads to an in  crease in 
in fla tion  ex pec ta tions.  The  com bined  ef fect,  how -
ever, points to a rule for the gradu  al  ist nom  i  nal in  -
ter  est rate, un  less b  is very high, which, ac  cord  ing
to the es  ti  mates presented by Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999), seems unlikely.
It is also in  ter  est  ing to con  sider the sit  u  a  tion in
which the covariance be  tween pa  ram  e  ters (s ab) is
not zero. In this case, the ob  jec  tive func  tion (5b)
will be equal to:
a b r ab r
r
t t t t

















s p s s p e ( ) rt ab s
(5c)
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(14)Some stud  ies have at  tempted to quan  tify the im  por  tance of
“Brainard’s ef  fect”. Sack (1998a) con  firms that if the im  pact of
mon  e  tary pol  icy on the econ  omy is un  cer  tain, a more ag  gres  -
sive  pol icy  may  in duce  ex ces sive  vol a til ity  on  tar get  vari ables.
In that sense, it may be op  ti  mal to ad  just of  fi  cial in  ter  est rates
grad  u  ally in or  der to de  lib  er  ately limit the risks of in  creased
vol a til ity  on  the  econ omy.  The  anal y sis  un der  pa ram e ter  un cer -
tainty ex  plains an im  por  tant part of ac  tual per  sis  tence in in  ter  -
est  rates.  How ever,  even  con sid er ing  ef fects  re sult ing  from
econ omy  dy nam ics  and  pa ram e ter  un cer tainty,  an  el e ment  of
inertia which is not explainable by data prevails in interest




















As it de  rives from equa  tion (10b), a high
covariance be  tween the two pa  ram  e  ters could lead 
to a sit  u  a  tion in which a more ag  gres  sive pol  icy
would be op  ti  mal (see An  nex).(15)
Fi  nally, it should be noted that these find  ings
ob  vi  ously de  pend on the type of model pre  sented. 
Start  ing from a model with an ob  jec  tive func  tion
that at  ta  ches some weight to out  put sta  bili  sa  tion,
Söderstrom (2000) shows that in some sit  u  a  tions
pa ram e ter  un cer tainty  could  in duce  mon e tary  au -
thor  i  ties to choose a more ag  gres  sive mon  e  tary
pol  icy. In par  tic  u  lar, when there is un  cer  tainty
about the de  gree of per  sis  tence of in  fla  tion (pa  -
ram e ter  a), there could be cases in which it would
be op  ti  mal to change in  ter  est rates in a more ag  -
gres  sive fash  ion, in or  der to re  duce un  cer  tainty
about fu  ture de  vel  op  ments in the econ  omy. How  -
ever, un  cer  tainty about the im  pact of mon  e  tary
pol icy  on  the  econ omy  (pa ram e ter  b)  con tin ues  to
lead to a less aggressive policy, in line with
Brainard’s analysis.
4.3. Optimal monetary policy under uncertainty
about the state of the economy
The  as sumed  hy poth e sis  that  au thor i ties  are
com  pletely aware of the state of the econ  omy ne  -
glects two im  por  tant sources of un  cer  tainty: the
ex  is  tence of er  rors in the mea  sure  ment of vari  ables 
and the un  cer  tainty about the type of shocks af  -
fect  ing the econ  omy. This could emerge ei  ther be  -
cause cer  tain vari  ables, such as GDP, are only
avail  able with some time lag and are sub  ject to fre  -
quent re  vi  sions, or be  cause there is an  other type of 
vari  ables,  such as the out  put gap, whose mea  sure  -
ment is not di  rect and whose re  sults are sen  si  tive
to the method of estimation used.
Mea sure ment  er rors  may  be  con sid ered  within
mod  els sim  i  larly to ad  di  tive shocks. If this is the
case, there is no change in the op  ti  mal pol  icy rule.
For ex  am  ple, in the pre  vi  ous model, if we as  sume
that the out  put gap shows mea  sure  ment er  rors,
equa  tion (2) may be changed to:
 
)
x br t t t t + + + =- + + 1 1 1 e x (2a)
where 
)
xt+1 rep  re  sents the out  put gap mea  sure
used  by  mon e tary  au thor i ties  and  xt
y
+1 the mea  -
sure ment  er ror  as so ci ated.  Since  au thor i ties  can -
not  dis tin guish  be tween  the  con tri bu tion  to  the
out put  gap  es ti mate  re sult ing  from  the  ad di tive
shock and that de  riv  ing from a mea  sure  ment er  -
ror, the op  ti  mal pol  icy rule given (1) and (2a)
remains (6).
How  ever, within mod  els with dif  fer  ent types of 
shocks  re quir ing  dif fer ent  pol icy  re sponses,  the  ex -
is  tence of mea  sure  ment er  rors could make the
prob lem  of  iden ti fy ing  shocks  par tic u larly  com -
plex.  For  ex am ple,  a  mon e tary  au thor ity,  whose
pur  pose is to limit out  put gap and in  fla  tion fluc  tu  -
a  tions vis-à-vis a tar  get, typ  i  cally raises the in  ter  -
est rate in the pres  ence of a pos  i  tive de  mand
shock. How  ever, if the out  put es  ti  mate shows
mea sure ment  er rors  it  be comes  more  com pli cated
to know whether an out  put rise re  flects a de  mand
shock, a sup  ply shock or whether it is merely the
re  sult of a mea  sure  ment er  ror. There  fore, rais  ing
in  ter  est rates on the as  sump  tion that the out  put
rise was the result from a demand shock could be
a wrong decision.
Smets (1998) and Orphanides (1998) ex  am  ine
the ex  tent to which er  rors in out  put gap mea  sure  -
ment (Smets) and in out  put gap and in  fla  tion mea  -
sure  ment (Orphanides) could af  fect the op  ti  mal
re  sponse of the Fed  eral Re  serve. Both stud  ies as  -
sume that mon  e  tary pol  icy is de  fined ac  cord  ing to
a Tay  lor rule. Firstly, the op  ti  mal rule is de  rived
as  sum  ing that there are no mea  sure  ment er  rors.
Sub  se  quently, this rule is de  rived ad  mit  ting the ex  -
is  tence of mea  sure  ment er  rors. The re  sults sug  gest 
that if these er  rors are sig  nif  i  cant the op  ti  mal re  -
sponse of mon  e  tary pol  icy tends to be more grad  -
ual:(16) “When the noise con  tent of the data is
prop  erly taken into ac  count, pol  icy re  ac  tions are
cau  tious and less sen  si  tive to the ap  par  ent im  bal  -
ances in the un  fil  tered data. The re  sult  ing pol  icy
pre scrip tions  re flect  the  rec og ni tion  that  ex ces -
sively ac  tiv  ist policy can increase rather than
decrease economic instability” [Orphanides
(1998)].
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(15)Al  though the con  clu  sion point  ing to a greater grad  u  al  ism is
better known, Brainard (1967) ac  knowl  edges that the ex  is  tence
of high covariances be  tween the pa  ram  e  ters of the model may
lead to a more ag  gres  sive mon  e  tary pol  icy. Mar  tin and
Salomon (1998) as  sess the im  pact of the ex  is  tence of non-zero
covariances for the case of the United Kingdom.4.4. Optimal monetary policy under uncertainty
about the economic model
The anal  y  sis made in the pre  vi  ous three sub  sec  -
tions as  sumed that au  thor  i  ties know the type of
un  cer  tainty they are fac  ing. For ex  am  ple, to es  ti  -
mate the op  ti  mal pol  icy rule (10), it is nec  es  sary to
know the pa  ram  e  ter vari  ance and also to iden  tify
ad  di  tive shocks on the econ  omy. Sim  i  larly, the
work by Orphanides (1998) ad  mits that au  thor  i  ties 
know the vari  ance of mea  sure  ment er  rors of vari  -
ables. How  ever, the type of un  cer  tain  ties faced by
pol icy  mak ers  is  in  prac tice  con sid er ably  wider.
More  pre cisely,  mon e tary  au thor i ties  ig nore  the
func  tional form of the “true” model of the econ  -
omy and which variables should be included in
that model.
Some stud  ies have at  tempted to ana  lyse how
mon  e  tary pol  icy should be con  ducted un  der
model un  cer  tainty - also known in the lit  er  a  ture as 
“Knightian  un cer tainty”.  The  so-called  lit er a ture
on ro  bust con  trol con  sid  ers this type of un  cer  -
tainty and pres  ents some prin  ci  ples about the es  ti  -
ma  tion of the op  ti  mal mon  e  tary pol  icy rule, tak  ing 
into  ac count  the  dif fer ent  mod els/par a digms  at  the 
dis posal  of  a  mon e tary  au thor ity.  Svens son  (2000)
identifies three approaches in literature.
The first ap  proach, re  ferred to as Bayesian,
starts by cal  cu  lat  ing for each mon  e  tary pol  icy rule
f, the loss in each model (m) across all avail  able
mod els  and/or  par a digms  (M). Sec  ondly, a sub  jec  -
tive  prob a bil ity  ( ) pm  is at  trib  uted to each ac  tual
loss and the so-called ex  pected loss is calculated:





where  ( ) L f m ,  de  fines the loss func  tion of the
model  m, us  ing the pol  icy rule f. The op  ti  mal pol  -
icy rule f






Gerdsmeier et al (2002) pres  ent other weight  ing
choices, as the weight  ing of the mod  els them  selves 
or of op  ti  mal pol  icy rules ob  tained in each model,
con  clud  ing that any of these two ap  proaches pro  -
duces out  comes which area worse than those of
the  pre vi ous  method.
More  re cently,  lit er a ture  on  ro bust ness  con trol
has adopted an ap  proach that does not re  quire the 
ad vance  ex is tence  of  sub jec tive  prob a bil i ties  to
weight the dif  fer  ent mod  els un  der re  view. The
meth  od  ol  ogy used con  sists in the so-called
min-max  cri  te  rion [see, for ex  am  ple, Onatski and
Stock (2000) or Gerdsmeier et al (2002)]. For each
mon e tary  pol icy  rule  f, the max  i  mum loss across
avail  able mod  els is cal  cu  lated and the op  ti  mal pol  -
icy rule f
* is the rule that mini  mises max  i  mum
losses. In other words, the op  ti  mal pol  icy rule is
that show  ing the best out  come in the range of the
different worst-case scenarios. In formal terms:
 
( ) f MinMax L f m
f F m M
* , =
Î Î
Onatski and Stock (2002) use this cri  te  rion to
iden  tify ro  bust pol  icy rules, start  ing from the US
econ  omy model pre  sented by Rudebusch and
Svens  son (1999). In this work four dif  fer  ent types
of  un cer tainty  are  con sid ered:  pa ram e ter  un cer -
tainty, un  cer  tainty about data qual  ity, un  cer  tainty
about the de  gree of se  rial cor  re  la  tion of shocks
and un  cer  tainty about the model it  self. The key
find  ing was that the dif  fer  ent forms of spec  i  fy  ing
un cer tainty  pro duce  dif fer ent  im pli ca tions  on  the
de gree  of  mon e tary  pol icy  ac tiv ism.  More over,  au -
thors con  clude that the main source of un  cer  tainty 
for pol  icy mak  ers is that as  so  ci  ated with the model 
of the econ  omy it  self and ag  gres  sive  ness found in
some estimated policy rules is linked to worst-case 
scenarios.
Fi  nally, a third ap  proach [see, for ex  am  ple,
Levin  et al (1999)] con  sists in at  tempt  ing to iden  -
tify mon  e  tary pol  icy rules per  form  ing well across
a wide range of mod  els ( i.e. ro  bust rules). By def  i  -
ni  tion, this type of rules do not per  form as well as
the op  ti  mal rule de  rived in each par  tic  u  lar model,
but is de  signed to work smoothly within that
model and across alternative models.
The im  pact of this par  tic  u  lar source of un  cer  -
tainty — per  haps the most im  por  tant one — on
the con  duct of mon  e  tary pol  icy is an evolv  ing
mat  ter, and there is nei  ther a con  sen  sual man  ner
of  iden ti fy ing  ro bust  mon e tary  pol icy  rules  nor  a
clear bal  ance about the de  gree of mon  e  tary pol  icy
grad u al ism.  How ever,  an  im por tant  find ing  in  the
most  re cent  lit er a ture  on  ro bust ness  con trol  is  that
in worst-case sce  nar  ios in  ter  est rate rules point to
greater  ag gres sive ness.  The  un der ly ing  view  is
that some types of un  cer  tainty may lead to a
smaller than ex  pected im  pact of mon  e  tary pol  icy
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cir  cum  stances, in or  der to pre  vent worst-case sce  -
nar  ios, it would be optimal to react more
aggressively when under uncertainty. 
5. FINAL REMARKS
The find  ings in some em  pir  i  cal stud  ies sug  gest
that  mon e tary  pol icy  in  dif fer ent  coun tries  has
been char  ac  ter  ised by a de  gree of in  ter  est rate
grad  u  al  ism, which can  not be strictly ex  plained by
the dy  namic struc  ture of the econ  omy. In other
words, the op  ti  mal path for in  ter  est rates emerg  -
ing  from  dif fer ent  mac ro eco nomic  mod els  is  nor -
mally less grad  ual than that ob  served in prac  tice.
A  pos si ble  ex pla na tion  for  the  di ver gence  be tween 
in  di  ca  tions given by mod  els and ac  tual prac  tice is
that the for  mer may not deal ad  e  quately with dif  -
fer ent  sources  of  un cer tainty  sur round ing  mon e -
tary  pol icy  de ci sions.  Com mon  in tu ition  seems  to
point to the fact that the in  tro  duc  tion of un  cer  -
tainty should lead to a more cau  tious po  si  tion of
mon e tary  au thor i ties.  This  view  re flects  Brainard’s 
find ings  (1967).  How ever,  from  a  the o ret i cal  point
of view, as ar  gued by dif  fer  ent au  thors [see, for ex  -
am  ple, Onatski and Williams (2002)], greater
uncertainty does not necessarily mean more
gradual monetary policy. 
An im  por  tant find  ing in this ar  ti  cle re  lates to
the fact that dif  fer  ent hy  poth  e  ses about the form
of  un cer tainty  have  dif fer ent  im pli ca tions  in  terms
of  the  op ti mal  de gree  of  mon e tary  pol icy  grad u al -
ism. In that sense, mon  e  tary au  thor  i  ties should as  -
sess the dif  fer  ent sources of un  cer  tainty and com  -
bine them com  pre  hen  sively. A well de  signed mon  -
e  tary pol  icy strat  egy should take into ac  count the
pres  ence and the im  pli  ca  tions of those dif  fer  ent
sources of un  cer  tainty. This sug  gests that a mon  e  -
tary au  thor  ity should not rely on a sin  gle in  di  ca  tor 
or model sep  a  rately. On the con  trary, it should as  -
sem  ble sev  eral sources of in  for  ma  tion, cross check
their contents and assess their implications.
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ANNEX 
IMPACT ON THE OPTIMAL POLICY RULE OF THE EXISTENCE 
OF NON-ZERO  COVARIANCES  BETWEEN PARAMETERS  
Tak  ing into ac  count that the mean squared er  ror of in  fla  tion ex  pec  ta  tions can be writ  ten as (see
foot note  12):
  E E t t t t t t p p p + + + = + 1
2 2
1 1 var (I)
With the vari  ance be  ing de  fined as:
 
vart t a t b t t t ab r r p s p s s p s e + = + + - 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 (II)
When the pa  ram  e  ter vari  ances and the re  spec  tive covariance are zero, (II) does not de  pend on
the real in  ter  est rate. This is there  fore the cer  tainty equiv  a  lence situation.







b t t ab r
r
+ = -
1 2 2 (III)
If the covariance be  tween a  and b is zero, a rise in the real in  ter  est rate will then si  mul  ta  neously
lead to an in  crease in the vari  ance of fu  ture in  fla  tion. How  ever, if the covariance be  tween the pa  -
ram  e  ters is suf  fi  ciently large and pos  i  tive, the Brainard prin  ci  ple will then cease to oc  cur, be  cause a
rise in the real in  ter  est rate re  duces the in  fla  tion vari  ance, and the mon  e  tary au  thor  i  ties no longer
face a policy dilemma. 
This re  sult seems to be rel  a  tively in  tu  itive. For ex  am  ple, it is as  sumed that the mul  ti  plier of mon  -
e tary  pol icy  b  and  the  pa ram e ter  mea sur ing  the  per sis tence  of  in fla tion  a  are strongly and pos  i  tively 
cor  re  lated, thereby re  sult  ing in a rule that points to a more ag  gres  sive mon  e  tary pol  icy. Thus, if the
per  sis  tence of in  fla  tion is high, and given the strong cor  re  la  tion be  tween pa  ram  e  ters, the ac  tual sit  -
u  a  tion would (de  sir  ably) reveal a higher monetary policy efficiency.
The  pos si ble  ex is tence  of  a  strong  pos i tive  cor re la tion  be tween  pa ram e ters  is  of  an  em pir i cal  na -
ture. For ex  am  ple, Sack (1998a) does not find ev  i  dence of a more ag  gres  sive mon  e  tary pol  icy for the 
United States, as  sum  ing the pres  ence of parameter uncertainty.